Two experiments were conducted to replicate and extend previous findings which indicated that judgment bias about the extent of one's own knowledgl e can be decreased by a de-biasing technique called counterfactual reasoning, that is, having people consider why their answers to questions may be wrong. The results of the two experiments confirm the effectiveness of this technique to decrease bias, by statistically controlling for important variables. The results extend previous findings about its effectiveness, by showing that counterfactual reasoning (a) reduced bias on knowledge questions about a specific subject area and (b) reduced bias on both hard and easy test questions. In addition, the two experiments establish that bias and test performance are inversely related, and a theoretical connection between this relationship and the ubiquitous hard/easy effect in bias research is offered. The results are discussed in terms of decision-making processes and the potentially detrimental effects of bias on test performance and learning in general.
Numerous studies have found that people tend to be poor judges of the extent of their own level of knowledge when asked general knowledge or other kinds of questions. For example, several studies have found that people overestimate their understanding of material they have just read (Morris, 1990; Pressley & Ghatala, 1988 , 1990 , whereas others have found that people overestimate the accuracy of their answers to general knowledge questions about geography, history, literature, science, sports, and so forth (Adams & Adams, 1961; Bradley, 1981; Fisch hoff, Siovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977) . This tendency to be overconfident about the accuracy of one's answers extends to spatial judgments (Schraw & Roedel, 1994) , matching synonyms and antonyms (Pressley & Ghatala, 1988) , and other kinds of tasks (Lichtenstein & Fisch hoff, 1977) . As Fischhoff et al. (1977, p. 552 ) said, people are ''wrong too often when they are certain they are right:'
. People's confidence about their level of knowledge is usually measured by having them rate how sure they are of their answers to questions. Often, this is oone by having people assign scores between 0% and 100 % (Adams & Adams, 1961; Schraw & Roedel, 1994; Zakay & Glicksohn, 1992) , with 100 % representing their subjective probability or belief that they are "completely confident" of the answer to the question (Zakay & Glicksohn, 1992) . Similar subjective probability scales have been used to measure how certain people are they will engage in different kinds of behavior in the future (Flannelly, Flannelly, & McLeod, 1998; Flannelly & McLeod, 1991; Vallone, Griffin, Lin, & Ross, 1990) .
The correspondence between people's subjective statements of confidence and their objective performance on a test is called "calibration" by many authors (e.g. , Bjorkman, 1992; Schraw & Roedel, 1994) . People are said to be well-calibrated if their confidence in their performance equals their actual performance on a series of test questions. Persons are said to show bias (overconfidence or underconfidence) to the degree that confidence diverges from actual performance.
Bias in terms of overconfidence in the correctness of one's judgments (Le. , an unwarranted belief in being correct) has been consistently found on forced-choice and multiple-choice tests (Pressley & Ghatala, 1988 , 1990 Pressley, Ghatala, Woloshyn, & Pirie, 1990; Zakay & Glicksohn, 1992) . While most research has focused on overconfidence, people may exhibit underconfidence, instead of overconfidence, depending on the difficulty of the questions asked. A "hard-easy" effect has been found, in which people are underconfident that their answers to easy questions are correct and overconfident that their answers to hard questions are correct (Yates, Lee, & Shinotsuka, 1996) . Although this effect was originally reported by Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977) , it was not the focus of much research until recently (Pulford & Colman, 1997; Schraw & Roedel, 1994; Suantak, Bolger, & Ferrell, 1996; Yates et aI., 1996) . I n addition to the effect of item difficulty on judgment bias, there is a growing body of evidence that bias is inversely related to overall test performance. Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977) and Bjorkman (1992) presented data indicating that this might be so, but Bjorkman found no statistical effect of performance on bias, and Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977) did not examine this effect statistically. More recent studies have reported a sign ificant negative relationship between bias and performance (Flannelly, 1998, in press; Zakay & Glicksohn, 1992) .
Because the prevalence of overconfidence appears to pose a serious obstacle to effective learning, problem solving, and decision making, it is surprising how few researchers have examined ways to reduce it. Some studies have shown that bias can be reduced by giving people feedback about the accuracy of their judgments (Arkes, Christensen, Lai, & Blumer, 1987; Flannelly, 1998, in press; whereas others have found no effect of feedback on bias (Pulford & Colman, 1997) . Other research has tried to reduce bias by asking people to think about why they could be wrong.
Although the findings are limited (Hoch, 1985; Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980} , the latter approach does show promise. The basic premise of this approach is that people naturally tend to think of reasons they are right, but not why they might be wrong. Both studies tried to counter this natural tendency by having subjects generate and list reasons opposing each of the possible answers to a question. Hoch (1985) called this de-biasing approach "counterfactual reasoning," and empirical support for the underlying premise has subsequently been provided (McKenzie, 1994 (McKenzie, , 1997 Wasserman, Dorner, & Kao, 1990) . Neither Hoch (1985) nor Koriat et al. (1980) examined whether. the effectiveness of this technique was differentially affected by performance or item difficulty. Arkes et al. (1987) questioned the value of the approach, and no subsequent work has been done to test its usefulness. The current study tested the ability of counterfactual reasoning to reduce students' bias about their level of knowledge on test questions, in relation to their overall test performance. The study was specifically designed to test the effectiveness of counterfactual reasoning to reduce both underconfidence on easy questions and overconfidence on hard questions.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 tested the effectiveness of counterfactual reasoning to reduce students' judgment bias about their level of knowledge of topical questions on a multiple-choice test. To do so, the possible effects of item difficulty, students' test performance, and the number of supporting and opposing reasons generated by participants were statistically controlled by being incorporated into the experimental design. The number of reasons was included as a covariant in the design as a way of controlling for effort. This was done in light of findings that confidence varies directly with the amount of effort put into a task (Maki, Foley, Kajer, Thompson, & Willert, 1990; Paese & Sniezek, 1991) .
Recent studies have found that people focus their attention on a specific hypothesis or alternative during decision making, while they tend to ignore other alternatives (McKenzie, 1994 (McKenzie, , 1997 Wasserman et aI., 1990) . To the degree this is so, then considering reasons for and against this focal hypothesis or alternative should be sufficient for counterfactual reasoning to reduce bias (McKenzie, 1997) . McKenzie provides direct evidence to support this contention. In keeping with these findings, the present experiment asked participants to generate and list supporting or opposing reasons only for the answer they chose to each question on a test.
Methods

Participants
The participants in Experiment 1 were 34 undergraduate nursing students enrolled in a psychiatric-mental health nursing course. All students were first-semester seniors.
The sample consisted of 30 females and 4 males, between 23 and 29 years old, with a median age of 25 years. Half of the students were Caucasian and half were of Asian/Pacific ancestry. Final grades for the course ranged from A to F.
Procedures
The test instrument consisted of 28 multiple-choice questions in the domain of psychiatric-mental health nursing. Each test question was presented with a choice of four possible answers, from which the students were instructed to select the one they thought was correct. Each test item contained a box for students to indicate their choice of answer, a second box to write in the level of confidence that the answer they chose was correct, and a third, larger box in which to write reasons.
The test was administered as part of a course review, with no time limit imposed on its completion. Students were told their grade on the test would not affect their course grade. Participants were randomly assigned to either of the two conditions-reasons-for or reasons-against.
All students were given oral and written instructions to (a) choose an answer to each question and write it in the box provided; (b) list as many reasons as they could that supported or opposed it (depending upon condition: reasons-for or reasons-against); and, (c) then rate their confidence that the answer they chose was correct. Students were instructed to rate their confidence on a continuous scale from 0% to 100 % , where 0% meant they were "Not at all certain that this answer is the correct answer" to·the question, and 100 % meant they were "Certain that this is the correct answer" to the question. Students in the reasonsfor condition (n = 17) were told to list all the reasons they could that supported the answer they chose for each question, whereas students in the reasons-against condition (n = 17) were told to list as many reasons as they could that opposed the answer they chose for each question.
Measures
Performance on each item was scored as 0% or 100 % , while overall test performance was measured in terms of percentage of items answered correctly. Participants' confidence in their answers was measured by the confidence rating they assigned to the answer they chose for each question. These two measures were used to calculate the degree of bias between students' performance (correct = 100 % ; wrong = 0%) and their confidence rating on each test question (bias = confidence -performance). Positive bias indicated overconfidence, whereas negative bias indicated underconfidence.
Design and Analyses
Item analysis was used to group the 28 questions into two categories -hard and easy. To do this, questions were ranked by difficulty and their ran kings listed from high-difficulty level to low-difficulty level. The list was then split in half to produce equal numbers of test items in each category -14 hard and 14 easy items. By definition, the higher the item difficulty of a question is, the easier the question is (Sax, 1974) .
Between 70.6% and 100.0 % of participants correctly answered the easy items, whereas 20.6% to 67.7% correctly answered the hard items. Mean performance was 85.1 % (SO = 11.0) on easy items and 40.8% (SO = 14.8) on hard items.
Confidence and bias scores were separately analyzed in a 2 (between) x 2 (within) analysis of covariance design (ANCQVA), using number of reasons and overall test performance as covariants. The two between conditions were the reasons-for and reasons-against conditions, and the two within conditions were hard and easy items. No other control condition was included in the design of Experiment 1 , because studies by Koriat et al. (1980) and Hoch (1985) both reported that overconfidence did not differ between subjects who listed supporting reasons and those who did not list any reasons. Correlational analyses between various measures were conducted as indicated in the text. Table 1 gives the means and standard deviations for confidence and bias on hard and easy questions for students in each condition. Although average confidence was lower on harder questions, confidence did not differ significantly between hard and easy items. Nor was any effect found for this measure with respect to condition, or the number of reasons generated by students. A, significant performance effect was found, F(1, 31) = 5.49, P < .05, however, in which confidence was inversely related to total test performance, r(32)= -.36, P < .05. Performance also had a significant effect on bias, F(1, 31) = 46.00, P < .001 , with bias being inversely related to overall test performance, r(32) = -.78, P < .001. As expected, bias was also found to be inversely related to item difficulty, F(1, 31) = 17.75, P < .001, with students showing overconfidence on hard items (M = 32.7, SO = 23.1), and underconfidence on easy items (M = -4.4, SO = 15.7), regardless of condition. A significant interaction was found between condition and item difficulty, F(1, 31) = 5.20, P < .05, with students in the reasons-against condition showing less oveconfidence on hard items and less underconfidence on easy items than students in the reasons-for condition. This effect is clearly seen in Table 1 . The main effect of item difficulty was also significant, F(1, 31} = 17.1, P < .001.
Results
The number of reasons generated by students did not differ appreciably between conditions, and no statistical effect of number of reasons was found. On average, students gave less than one reason per question, with students in the reasons-against condition generating a mean total of 27.1 (SO = 11.0), compared to the 23.1 reasons (SO = 11.9) given by students in the reasons-for condition.
Despite instructions to the contrary, a small number of participants changed some of their answers. Visual inspection of the completed test sheets revealed that 2 participants in the reasons-for condition changed one of their answers, whereas 4 participants in the reasons-against condition changed one to three of their answers.
Discussion
These results indicate that generating reasons against one's answers to questions decreases judgment bias in terms of, both, reducing overconfidence on hard questions, and reducing underconfidence on easy items. Because no significant difference was found between the average confidence ratings of the two groups, this effect cannot be attributable to an overall decrease in confidence among students in the reasons-against condition. It must, instead, arise from increases in judgment accuracy by students who were asked, essentially, to generate reasons why they could be wrong each time they answered a question. Students who were asked to generate reasons why their answers wer~ correct were less accurate in their judgments.
These results support the hypothesis that generating reasons that contradict an alternative reduces judgment bias about one's own level of knowledge. The results of Experiment 1 extend previous findings by showing that listing opposing reasons reduces both underconfidence and overconfidence.
As reported in previous studies, bias was found to be inversely related to item difficulty, that is, participants were overconfident on hard items and underconfident on easy items. More interestingly, the present findings indicate that bias is inversely related to test performance. Students who did better on the test were generally more accurate in judging whether their answers were correct. A negative relationship between performance and confidence was also found in Experiment 1, contrary to the findings of Zakay and Glicksohn (1992) , who reported a positive relationship between performance and confidence. Nevertheless, Experiment 1 confirms the findings of these researchers that overconfidence is related to poor performance (Glicksohn & Zakay, 1994; Zakay & Glicksohn, 1992) .
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 further tested the ability of counterfactual reasoning to reduce bias using a within-subject design that included a no-reasons control condition. While Experiment 1 showed that listing reasons-against one's answers reduces bias relative to listing reasons-for one's answers, the effect of the latter cannot be determined without a no-reasons control. Therefore, Experiment 2 was designed to compare directly the effects of listing reasons for, reasons against, and no reasons on bias.
A recent study by Pulford and Colman (1997) reported that females exhibited less overconfidence than males on test questions. Although the number of males in Experiment 2 was small, it was decided to conduct a separate analysis of the data to examine potential gender effects.
Methods
Participants
The participants were 36 undergraduate nursing students enrolled in a course in psychiatric-mental health nursing. Of the 36 participants, 30 were female and 6 were male. The participants were not the same students as those who participated in Experiment 1.
Participants ranged in age from 22 to 46 years, with the median being 26 years of age. Roughly 36% of participants were Caucasian and 64% were of Asian/Pacific ancestry. All participants were second-semester seniors. Final course grades ranged from A to C.
Procedures
The test instrument consisted of a total of 33 multiple-choice questions in the field of psychiatric-mental health nursing, with four answer options to each question. The 33-item test was divided into three parts, or subtests, which were administered (with no time limit) once a week for 3 consecutive weeks. Each subtest was divided into three sections to be answered under one of three conditions: reasons for, reasons against, no reasons. All students were tested under each of the three conditions on each subtest, with condition order controlled within and across subtests by a Greco-Latin square.
As in Experiment 1, participants were instructed to choose an answer to each test question and to write it in the box provided, then, depending on the condition, to either (a) list all the reasons they could that supported their answer; (b) list all the reasons they could that opposed their answer; or (c) not list any reasons for or against their answer. A box was provided after each question in the reasons-for and reasons-against conditions in which to list reasons. Participants were instructed to rate their confidence that the answer they gave was correct on a 0 % -100 % scale, after they listed their reasons.
Design and Analyses
As in Experiment 1 , the measures used in the analyses included item difficulty, performance, confidence, and bias. Because no effect of number of reasons was found in Experiment 1, this variable was not included in Experiment 2. Item analysis was used to group the 33 questions into hard and easy categories, as explained in Experiment 1. Between 68.8% and 90.6% of students correctly answered easy questions and 16.3% to 62.5% correctly answered hard questions. Mean performance was 80.20/0 (SO = 12.4) on easy questions and 45.5% (SO = 16.7) on hard questions.
The effects of treatment on confidence and bias were each analyzed by ANCOVA, using total test performance as a covariant, in a 3 (condition order) x 3 (conditions) x 2 (item difficulty) design. A second, similar design was used to analyze possible gender effects: 2 (gender) x 3 (conditions) x 2 (item difficulty), with total test performance used as the covariant. Because of the small number of males in the sample, the second ANCOVA used an unweighted means analysis. Other analyses are described in the text.
Results
Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations for confidence and bias by condition and item difficulty. The analysis of bias scores revealed significant main effects of condition, F(2, 64) = 4.85, P < .05, item difficulty, F(1, 64) = 6.04, P < .05, and a marginally significant interaction of conditions with item difficulty, F(2, 64) = 2.18, P < .10. As seen in Table 2 , students exhibited less bias in the reasons-against condition, in terms of both decreased underconfidence on easy items and decreased overconfidence on hard items. No signifcant effects of gender or condition order were found for either confidence or bias. Orthogonal contrasts revealed that bias scores in the reasonsagainst condition were significantly lower than those in the other conditions, F(1, 64) = 4.07, P < .05. Bias did not differ significantly between the reasons-for and no-reasons conditions. A significant effect of performance was found, F(1, 32) = 11.43, P < .01 , in which bias was inversely related to performance, r(34) = -.45, P < .01 . A significant effect of performance on confidence was also found, F(1, 32) = 7.92, P < .01, but the correlation was positive instead of negative, r(34) = .45, P < .01.
Although they were instructed not to do so, 19 participants changed between one and five of their answers on the 33-item test. Analysis of variance performed on the number of answers changed by these 19 participants revealed a signifcant difference between the number of answers changed in the three conditions, F(2, 34) = 4.26, P < .05.
Orthogonal contrasts found no difference between the number of answers changed in the reasons-for (M = 0.78, SO = 0.92) and reasons-against (M = 0.53, SO = 0.51) conditions. However, the number of answers changed in both of these conditions was significantly higher than that observed in the control condition F(1, 32) = 20.36, P < .001 (M = 0.16, SO = 0.37).
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 further confirm that generating reasons against one's answers to questions reduces judgment bias. As found in Experiment 1, this effect was observed in terms of decreased overconfidence on hard questions, as well as decreased underconfidence on easy items. This eHect was observed even though there was no appreciable difference in confidence between the three conditions. This observation indicates that counterfactual reasoning improved the calibration of students' judgments about their level of knowledge, without affecting confidence per se.
Experiment 2 also confirmed the negative relationship between bias and performance. This inverse relationship between bias and performance was found in both experiments even though the relationship between confidence and performance was reversed in the second experiment. In Experiment 2, confidence was directly related to performance, as reported by Zakay and Glicksohn (1992) . The constancy of the relationship between bias and performance, despite this difference, further illustrates the extent of independence between confidence, per se, and the accuracy of judgments (Bjorkman, 1992; Paese & Sniezek, 1991) . Pulford and Colman (1997) reported that males were more overconfident than females on general knowledge questions. Although the present study was unable to confirm this effect, the failure to do so may be attributed to the fact that there were very few males in the sample we tested. To our knowledge, other studies have not examined gender differences in judgment bias.
General Discussion
The two experiments reported herein confirm previous findings that generating contradictory reasons reduces judgment bias about one's level of knowledge. Our results extend earlier findings by showing that listing opposing reasons reduces both underconfidence and overconfidence, and by showing that this de-biasing technique is effective in reducing bias on domain-specific questions.
The findings of some studies suggest that bias results from a common tendency to favor positive rather than negative information, such that people are more likely to base judgments on supportive rather than contradictory evidence (Arkes, 1981; Klayman & Young-Won, 1987; McKenzie, 1997; Shanteau, 199-2; Wasserman et aI., 1990) . By having people generate reasons why their answers could be wrong, they are forced to consider negative information that they would usually ignore. Having participants explicitly generate reasons supporting their answers does not reduce overconfidence because they would have done so, implicitly, anyway. This failure to weigh properly negative evidence, which is also illustrated in the present study, appears to be a major factor in judgment bias (McKenzie, 1997) . Hoch (1985) thought that once a person chose an answer, their confidence in that answer would be crystallized by a tendency towards cognitive consistency that ignores contraqictory evidence. Given this, Hoch believed that counterfactual reasoning could only reduce bias if it was used as an intervention before a person gave an answer. Although he did not believe it would work, Hoch (1985) recommended an experimental test of counterfactual reasoning in which participants first gave an answer, next generated reasons against it, and then evaluated the likelihood it is correct. This is precisely what the students in Experiments 1 and 2 were instructed to do. Yet counterfactual reasoning still reduced bias significantly, illustrating that the students had not become so fixated on their answers that the answers were no longer open to refutation (Klayman & Young-Won, 1987; Wason, 1968) . Although relatively few answers were changed by participants, as seen in Experiment 2, they were more likely to change their answers if they generated either reasons for or reasons against them.
Recent studies have shown that bias is inversely related to item difficulty (Pulford & Colman, 1997; Schraw & Roedel, 1994; Suantak et aI., 1996) and the present study provides further evidence of this effect. As reported in past studies, participants were found to be oveconfident on hard items and underconfident on easy ones. That is, participants tended to underrate their certainty about their answers to easy questions, and to overrate their confidence in their answers to hard questions, relative to their actual performance on each question.
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that judgment bias is inversely related to test performance. Though prior research implied this might be so (Bjorkman, 1992; Zakay & Glicksohn, 1992) , the present study is the first to confirm this effect statistically and to demonstrate a negative linear relationship between bias and test performance. This inverse relationship was found in both experiments even though confidence was negatively correlated with performance in Experiment 1 and positively correlated with performance in Experiment 2. Zakay and Glicksohn (1992) , who reported a positive relationship between performance and confidence, also reported that students who were overconfident performed more poorly on a test of domain knowledge (Glicksohn & Zakay, 1994; Zakay & Glicksohn, 1992) . Zakay and Glicksohn (1992) thought that overconfident students may have made more mistakes because they did not look as critically at their answers as better students did. This interpretation may also provide a partial explanation of the hard/easy effect. In essence, test performance and item difficulty are different measures of the same thing. Performance is a measure of how many questions an individual participant answered right or wrong, whereas item difficulty is a measure of the number of questions all participants answered right or wrong. Therefore, the effects of item difficulty and performance on bias both reflect differences in bias on questions people answer right or wrong. Presumably, people think less critically about the questions they answer wrong than they do about the questions they answer right, as Zakay and Glicksohn (1992) , among others, have suggested. This further undermines the idea that bias is a by-product of item difficulty, and suggests, instead, that the way in which people deal with questions lies at the heart of judgment bias.
An initial, brief examination of a question can produce a feeling-ofknowing the answer to it, which may be triggered by partial memory retrieval of the answer or other cues (Reder & Ritter, 1992; Schwartz, 1994) . In the case of multiple-choice tests these cues would include the available answers to the questions. This feeling-of-knowing an answer is unrelated to item difficulty (Widner & Smith, 1996) , and it is positively, but only weakly, associated with answering the question correctly (Costermans, Lories, & An say, 1992; Schwartz, 1994; Widner & Smith, 1996) . Thus, it could lead to a false sense of confidence about a given answer being correct and preclude the pursuit of other strategies for answering the question, such as a logical analysis of the question and the elimination of alternatives (Reder & Ritter, 1992) . Even when this is done, however, confidence judgments tend to be more intuitive than logical, according to Tversky and Koehler (1994) , typically resulting in overconfidence. Both the feeling-of-knowing and confidence in the accuracy of one's judgments are commonly used, but imperfect, heuristics for information processing and decision making. Zakay and Glicksohn (1992) recommended that students' performance could be enhanced through training to optimize their decision-making strategies (Zakay, 1985) , specifically, in terms of test taking-that is, increasing '1estwiseness:' Although we agree with this suggestion, the implications of judgment bias about one's own knowledge go well beyond test taking. As Pressley and Ghatala (1988) have argued, the inaccuracy of people's judgments about their own knowledge undercut standard assumptions about self-monitoring and self-regulation during learning. And, it may be a serious obstacle to effective learning (Pressley & Ghatala, 1988) . To the degree this is so, the critical thinking skills of students should be fostered so the students come to appreciate the importance of weighing both positive and negative evidence .
